Tuesday, August 30, 2011
HARYANA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: PROTESTS MOUNT
Raghu
ON July 25, national dailies carried almost three full pages of the Haryana government’s notification to acquire around 1400 acres of land mostly in the village of Gorakhpur in Fatehabad district, Haryana for setting up a nuclear power plant (NPP). The notification under Section 6 of the colonial, antiquated and soon to be abandoned Land Acquisition Act of 1894, is supposed to be the final step in the process of the state acquiring land for public purpose. But it will certainly not be the last we hear about this project.
Farmers in the region are getting increasingly restive, especially since the Fukushima disaster which was covered widely in the media. Although many farmers of Gorakhpur village, almost half of them by some estimates, had earlier agreed to part with their land and had even accepted compensation, they are now having second thoughts. The rethink has been spurred on not only by post-Fukushima fears but also by the dogged resistance of other villagers who have been holding a dharna opposite the district secretariat at Fatehabad since August 2010 and who have been joined in ever increasing numbers by concerned residents of other villages in the project area organised under the banner of the Kisan Sangharsh Samiti.
A recent public meeting organised on August 9 by the All India Kisan Sabha was attended by over 400 local residents, Kisan Sangharsh Samiti representatives, panchayat leaders and mass organisations. D Raghunandan, president, All India Peoples Science Network delivered a special address.
What are the issues raised specifically with respect to the Gorakhpur project? What similarities or differences are there in relation to the Jaitapur project, opposition to which is well-known in the Gorakhpur NPP project area and elsewhere in Haryana? What issues arise regarding nuclear power in general in India?
PROJECT AND PROCEDURES
The Haryana government has eagerly pursued the Gorakhpur NPP and the UPA-II government has responded expeditiously, keen on a huge and rapid expansion of nuclear energy in India despite mounting criticism of this policy and the manner in which it is being pursued. The central government’s incentive of sharing 50 per cent of the power generated with the concerned state has been seen in power-starved Haryana as a win-win. So much so that even while opposition to the Gorakhpur project has gathered momentum in the area, the Haryana government has identified the site for a second nuclear power plant project in nearby Balsamand village in Hisar district! In this over-enthusiasm, it appears that several essential procedures as regards site selection have been given the go-bye or at best approached very casually.
The Gorakhpur NPP is being set up by the Nuclear Power Corporation Company Limited (NPCIL) in collaboration with the Haryana Power Generation Corporation (HPGC). The project seeks to set up 4 x 700 MW units, the first two slated to become operational in 2017 and the next two by 2019. Contrary to what some local people seem to believe, these units will be based on indigenous Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) unlike in Jaitapur where untested Areva reactors are to be imported from France. In Jaitapur, new issues have arisen and objections raised as regards safety, the technology being unfamiliar and facing safety questions from regulators even in France and in Finland where a first unit is being set up, and its exorbitant but hitherto undisclosed costs. On the face of it, the familiar Indian PHWR technology need not have raised similar objections as regards safety. However, things have undoubtedly and understandably changed, not only post Fukushima but also in light of other recent and historical developments in India.
Before coming to safety issues though, some other aspects of the project that have caused concerns should be discussed.
Even though the project has been on the shelf from as long back as 1984, surveys in the area to establish feasibility as required by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) were conducted in 2001, 2004 and lately in 2007. According to NPCIL and HPGC officials, the project site meets all the criteria laid down as regards type of activity in the area, quality of land, distance from populated areas, availability of water and so on. A closer examination, however, raises many questions.
One major concern is believed to have already been flagged by the ministry of environment and forests. The EIA guidelines and AERB norms require abundant availability of water in nuclear power plant sites. In PHWRs, water is required mainly for cooling with adequate availability to cover emergency situations when the plant overheats. Significantly, the relevant AERB or other regulatory documents always refer to the sea, rivers or lakes. But nowhere do they even mention irrigation canals. In Gorakhpur, the only possible source of water for the NPP is the Bhakra canal. The Haryana government has assured the project of 320 cusecs water supply for the plant. Even under normal circumstances, this would be a high proportion of the total water carried by the canal, but would enough water be available during lean season? And what would happen if an accident occurs? In Fukushima, many millions of gallons of sea water were used in efforts to cool down the reactor. Even though PHWRs are unlikely to experience the same kind of problem as Fukushima, the water carried by the irrigation canal is unlikely to be sufficient to meet emergency requirements, especially during lean season.
Farmers in the area are seriously concerned about the impact of diverting canal waters to the NPP on availability of water for irrigation and therefore on agricultural output. Of course, this cooling water may be recycled back into the canal somewhere downstream. But it is known that temperature of this water is likely to be 5-6 degrees Celsius higher than the input temperatures and, given the relatively low quantum of water flow in the canal, it is uncertain to what extent the temperature could be brought down or what impact the higher temperature of irrigation waters would have on the crops. Ironically, while these issues are being seriously debated as regards the Gorakhpur Project, the second site offered in Balsamand has very similar issues with water being sources from the Sutlej Yamuna Link (SYL Canal), itself subject to disputes between Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan!
It is not known whether these issues have at all been factored into site selection or environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the project. Indeed, it is not even known if a proper EIA has been conducted so far. There are now new guidelines for EIA for nuclear power plants prepared for the ministry of environment by the Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad in 2010. It is also not known if the site fully conforms to the zoning criteria recommended in the ASCI guidelines as discussed below.
SITING
Gorakhpur village is located near two large towns, Hisar and Fatehabad, with populations of around 300,000 and 75,000 respectively. AERB recommends that there should be no population centres of more than 100,000 population within 30km from the plant. But Fatehabad with a population already of around 75,000, with the district showing a 25 per cent population growth rate every decade, is around 25 km away as the crow flies, and Hisar with almost 300,000 people is just about 30 km away. The village of Badopal where the project is acquiring 185 acres for the plant township has a population of over 20,000, and is again on the margins of the 10 km distance prescribed by AERB. And the population of the several villages within the prescribed 5km “sterile zone” radius around Gorakhpur is definitely over 20,000 as required by AERB.
The Fukushima disaster has provoked serious thinking among farmers in the region. Residents of the region who earlier thought this was an issue that concerned only residents of Gorakhpur whose land was to be acquired, are now very conscious of the fact that they too would be badly affected if something untoward happens. Residents have seen that population in a 20 km radius around Fukushima have been evacuated, and farmers have seen that farm produce from villages in this radius, and for some produce from as far away as 100 km or more, have been virtually banned from sale while other produces are facing resistance from Japanese buyers and specially by importers in other countries.
The density of the population in the region is hardly surprising given that the area is a prosperous well-irrigated agricultural land served by the Bhakra canal, with productivity over double the state average. This is in sharp contrast to the claims often made by the Haryana government and HPGC officials to the effect that the land is not fertile and therefore choosing this location would not cause much loss. On the contrary, farmers in the region grow wheat and even paddy in some areas, with three crops a year being not uncommon. It is for this very reason that, although the union government has readied a new land acquisition bill which provides that acquisition of multiple-crop lands will not be permitted, that the provisions will have retrospective effect for pipeline projects and that all land acquisitions will be kept pending till the act comes into effect, the Haryana government has declared that these provisions will apply to all land acquisition cases except for the Gorakhpur NPP! Farmers of the area are furious that they are being singled out for this unfair treatment. Many residents are also contemplating returning the compensation they have taken, some admittedly in the hope of getting substantially higher amounts going by the example of the striking farmers of Noida Extension.
One of the major provisions in the EIA guidelines, as well as in any proper land acquisition process, is an examination of whether any alternatives have been explored. It does not appear that this has been done in the Haryana NPPs. Certainly, the Gorakhpur location has many problems as far as project siting is concerned.
SAFETY
The fact that the Gorakhpur NPP is based on the indigenous PHWR technology should have caused less anxiety on safety grounds that the untested Areva plant design selected for Jaitapur or other Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) likely to be available from the US. But Fukushima has changed public perception of safety issues related to nuclear energy. Fukushima has sharply focused attention on the necessity of having to visualise and prepare for worst-case scenarios rather than depending on the small probability of major accidents. With the higher costs this inevitably involves, and the magnitude of the damage likely to be caused in nuclear accidents, the question uppermost in the public mind is whether the risk is worth taking?
Unfortunately, the UPA-II government and the nuclear establishment has approached this deeply felt and serious public concern very casually. Within days of Fukushima, government and nuclear authorities were confidently asserting that such an accident could never happen in India. The promised safety audit of all nuclear facilities in the country was perfunctorily conducted and a clean chit predictably issued without public disclosure or discussion of the methodologies and findings of the safety audit.
This casual, some would say foolhardy and smug approach to nuclear safety has only reinforced the worst fears and skepticism not only in the general public but even among scientists, technologists, other experts and concerned citizens.
For instance, these have long demanded that the AERB be made fully independent of the government and especially of the department of atomic energy whose activities the regulatory and safety agency is supposed to exercise oversight on. The government has assured that this would be done, but no serious moves have yet been initiated. Given the off-hand manner with which the so-called safety audit was conducted post Fukushima, is it any wonder that public anxiety has only been heightened? Many commentators have pointed out that one of the biggest casualties of the Fukushima disaster has been the loss of confidence in government and public authorities in general among the Japanese public who are normally very compliant and respectful. The average Indian today has little respect or faith in public authorities and when it comes to safety issues, can hardly be expected to smilingly repose his unquestioning confidence in them. Certainly not after neither the AERB nor any other authority was able to prevent radioactive material finding its way from a Delhi University laboratory to a scrap yard just outside Delhi, or even respond to it quickly and effectively afterwards. And certainly not after huge oil storage facilities in Jaipur were simply left to burn themselves out including by much-vaunted disaster management agencies.
The guidelines for EIAs for nuclear facilities speak mostly of Design Basis Accidents (DBA), ie, those accidents that may occur within the usual parameters of a plant’s operations. It goes only to say that, of course, “beyond DBA accidents” could occur from extreme events like earthquakes, cyclones etc but that “such accidents can never be anticipated and/or fully programmed [for]” and leaves it to post-facto emergency preparedness plans, which are usually non-existent or ill-prepared with little infrastructure or institutional capability for implementation, to deal with them. But the issue, especially in the post-Fukushima scenario, is precisely that major accidents can and should no longer be viewed as something you hope will not happen, as something to be responded to after the fact, but as something that could very well happen and for which preparedness should be built-in to project planning and design from the outset.
There is little sign this is happening in India. Till a proper and publicly debated safety audit of all nuclear facilities in India is carried out, preferably by or in consonance with independent experts, until the AERB is made truly independent and accountable to parliament and the public, and until safety and accident preparedness are made integral parts of nuclear and in fact all industrial projects and public institutions with full public participation, the people of India will not feel safe about nuclear power. After Jaitapur, the public opposition to the Haryana project shows that the NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome is rapidly gathering momentum with regard to nuclear power plants. And if everybody says they do not want one in their backyard, well… there will be no place for them in India.
Courtesy: People’s Democracy
TAMILNADU - TNUEF CONVENTION DEMANDS HALT TO DIVERSION OF SUB-PLAN FUNDS
Ganesh
THE experience of the last 20 years shows that the Sub-Plan (earlier Sub-Component Plan) in the budget for SC/STs had been an eyewash. Though the process has been started by the Planning Commission 31 years ago, the Tamilnadu government took up this agenda only 20 years back. It was accepted in principle. That is all. Only in the last two-three years, the allotment of funds has been made. It was a mere ritual and even in that ritual process, STs were left out. The new government led by the AIADMK has now allotted funds for ST Sub Plan in the budget for 2011-2012.
The TNUEF that has taken up many issues of atrocities had decided to take the issue to its logical conclusion. It is an open secret that in the last 20 years, the funds that were meant for the upliftment of the oppressed sections have been diverted to other purposes. For the Commonwealth games, without any shame, this fund was utilised. Those who are in power have minted a lot of money through it, is a different story. In Tamilnadu, when the new hostel for the MLAs was constructed, in an unmindful manner, funds that were meant for dalits' welfare were diverted for construction of 44 houses. 44 legislative assembly constituencies are reserved for SCs in the state. This shows the utter callousness on the part of the state government. This was criticised by the TNUEF on earlier occasions. All the houses should have been constructed using the common fund, the TNUEF said.
The TNUEF had decided to organise a special convention on this to draw the attention of not only the government, but also the people of the state. The convention was held on August 10 in Chennai. A charter of demands was released during the deliberations. Earlier, a draft for the charter was circulated widely to get the inputs from various organisations, social thinkers, intellectuals etc. B V Raghavulu, vice president of KVPS, (Struggle Committee Against Caste Discrimination) Andhra Pradesh had released the charter of demands.
A rousing speech was delivered by him after releasing the charter. He exhorted the TNUEF to organise people's committees to monitor the funds whether they have been utilised for the earmarked project or have been diverted for other purposes. Further, in Andhra Pradesh, a big lake was created with the funds meant for dalits’ welfare. Even the earlier allotments and diversions should be exposed. An enquiry commission is necessary to find out the various problems faced by the dalits that includes the living conditions. The whereabouts of 12 lakh acre Panchami lands should be found out. The enquiry commission should go through the records of it. The experience of Andhra Pradesh is that due to the formation of an enquiry commission, many facts have come to light. Earlier, we were fighting for pattas, which gives land rights to the dalits. The demand has come now that we should fight to retrieve the lands that belonged to them, he said.
In his introductory speech, P Sampath, president, TNUEF, has castigated the Adi-Dravidar Welfare Department for merely collecting information. This department should become a monitoring agency for the expenditure of Sub-Plan funds. Just giving some concessions will not uplift the oppressed classes. Hence the need for Sub-Plan. To achieve the goal of this Plan, all democratic forces should come together to ensure its proper implementation. Because, this is not a caste issue, but a democratic issue, he said.
The CPI(M) will raise the issue of non-allocation of funds in the assembly, said A Soundarrajan, CPI(M) leader in the Tamilnadu assembly. He questioned the process of sale and purchase of dalit lands. The lands that were allotted to the dalits cannot be sold or purchased. With this law, how come lakhs of acres of lands have changed hands, he asked. Irrespective of buyers, even if they are in high positions, the lands should be brought back to dalits, he said.
P Shanmugam, state general secretary, AIKS, has charged that the Tamilnadu government is the only government that did not implement the Forest Rights Protection Act. Even in the present budget, there is no mention of it. S K Mahendran presided over the convention. Ex-IAS officers Sivakami, Karuppan, Manivannan, TN government additional secretary Christhu Das Gandhi, Fr Kumar, Nicolas, K Bhimrao, MLA, Jakkaiyan of Arunthamizhar Viduthalai Iyakkam and many other leaders took part in the event. The huge meeting hall could not accommodate the audience since thousands of people had assembled from all over the state. At the end, K Samuel Raj, general secretary, TNUEF had announced that a demonstration will be organised in all the district headquarters to demand the proper allocation and expenditure of the Sub-Plan. The audience approved it with thunderous applause.
The convention had passed many resolutions that include demanding a white paper on the expenditure of funds, demanding MPLADS and MLA funds to be spent for dalit welfare schemes, documentation of the lives of the historical personalities from the oppressed communities, demanding the government to conduct campaign on Atrocities Prevention Act, allotting more time in assembly and in local bodies to discuss the issues faced by the dalits etc.
Courtesy: People’s Democracy
TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC REGULATION OF THE MINERAL SECTOR
Archana Prasad
THE mineral sector has been under the monopoly control of the union government and has been facing several challenges, least of which arise out of the rapid and ill conceived policy of the liberalisation of the sector. Its problems have been well highlighted in the report on illegal mining by Justice Santosh Hegde which resulted in the resignation of the Karnataka chief minister. The report not only highlighted the lethal corporate-politician nexus behind illegal mining, it is also a revelation on the different aspects of the sector which need strict regulation. Some of these aspects include the question of mineral transportation, stock yard permissions and the methods of continuous monitoring that detect, record and punish rampant illegal mining. At the same time the growing conflicts in areas where land acquisition is taking place for mining have forced the State to revise its Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Bill 2010 to consider the sharing of benefits with local people. The revised Bill of 2011 (which is yet to be introduced in parliament) reportedly proposes that 26 per cent of the royalty from profits of coal mining and royalty from operational mines of all other minerals will be shared by local people. The debate over the nature and quantum of benefit sharing assumes that beneficiaries will have no objection to corporate mining if they receive adequate long term benefits from it. This idea has been endorsed by some prominent environmentalists who see the long term local share in profits as a natural resource rent to the people who live in the mineral rich areas. While this is an important aspect of the debate, we need to take a more holistic view about the challenges facing the sector if a people-oriented legislation is to be put in place.
SOCIAL CONTROL OVER EXTRACTION
The question of benefit sharing and regulation has to be seen in the context of rapidly changing character of the mining sector. The introduction of private capital in mining and increase in profit mining has been evident in the last five years. The intervention of private mining companies has also led to a qualitative change in the scale of illegal mining. The case of iron ore mining illustrates the point. In reply to a starred question in Rajya Sabha, the minister of state for mines put forth a statement that only 190 mining leases were granted to central public sector units between 2003 and 2011, while in the same period about 9967 mining leases were given to private sector companies. Not surprisingly the Congress-ruled states of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan topped the list of the states with private companies, with Gujarat following suit. This was accompanied by the threefold increase in foreign direct investment in the sector. In reply to another question, the minister stated that such investment had gone up to Rs 1785.04 crore between 2008 and 2011.
But the growth of private companies does not reveal the true picture about the nature of extraction in the sector. The legal licences granted to private companies were accompanied by the equivalent if not higher extraction from illegal mining. The figures before parliament are instructive. A total of 36,677 violations were recorded in 2006 and this figure went upto 82,330 cases in 2010. This showed that private companies had increased their rate of extraction beyond imaginable limits. This increase is also a result of the lack of social control over any type of mining operations, a fact reflected in the Bill of 2010, which is the last public version of the proposed law for the sector. The Bill ignores the lessons of the Lokayukta report which points to the lack of records or local monitoring systems of illegal operations and stockpiling as the main reasons for the leakages. It hardly sets up any local structures that can monitor and report illegal mining on a daily basis. Perhaps it is time that the Indian administrators learnt from other countries like Canada and Australia where local self and regional governments make their own mining rules and where recognised ‘aborigine councils’ in mineral rich areas could make their own rules to curb and monitor mining activities. Hence the overall mining regulation in Canada lays down a framework for the role of the local self and regional governments in monitoring mining operations. In the process those impacted by mining will find a voice in keeping a vigil over daily mining operations, and also find a forum to register their complaints, thus increasing the social control over the sector.
THE NATURE OF BENEFITS
The question of benefits and beneficiaries is also linked to the issue of social control over corporate mining. The returns in the form of royalty for minerals other than coal amounted to Rs 2610 crore in 2010-11 and this had declined sharply from Rs 3997.42 crore in 2009-2010. In some states like Maharashtra and Rajasthan the decline in royalty is seen from 2008 onwards. This means that a large extraction of minerals was taking place outside the formal system, leaving it out of the benefit sharing mechanism. It is therefore not surprising that the minister of mines, when asked in the Rajya Sabha, could not provide any information on whether 20 per cent of the proceeds from mining royalty were spent for the development of mining areas. The question of benefit sharing is therefore intimately linked with structures ensuring compliance and checking illegal mining. At the same time the question of benefits has to be seen in more than monetary terms. Mining affects health of people and material conditions (land, water, soil, biodiversity etc) of the surrounding villages. Is the amelioration of these factors and upgradation of the ecological infrastructure a part of the scheme of rehabilitation of the surrounding villages? If a mechanism is to be created for achieving this objective, then a development fund needs to be created out of mining returns. With the rapid growth of corporate capitalism in the mining sector it is not enough to simply speak of long term shares in profits. While this might be a step in the right direction to establish the principal of ‘natural resource rent’, it will not ensure the long term livelihood security of those living in mineral rich areas. This can only be done if the State ensures corporate compliance in eco-restoration of the area in the long term.
INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK
A third aspect that needs to be considered is that in India, the scope of mining regulation is very narrow. Current legislation largely covers only those activities like reconnaissance, prospecting and mining licenses which are connected with site level mining operations. All other aspects like environment clearances and land acquisitions are independent from this process of granting mining leases. Once a company gets a mining licence, it can apply for environmental clearance and once this clearance is got, the acquisition process begins. These processes are largely independent from each other and involve multiple agencies. Hence a project like POSCO may get conditional environmental clearance without a transparent and socially just land acquisition process. It is therefore important to think of a regulation that interlinks the process of land acquisition, environmental clearance and granting of mining leases. Here too, it is possible to learn from the developed countries whose laws for impact assessments and acquisition are sector specific. Thus a mining regulation incorporates the provisions relating to recognition of claims and rights, environmental impact and regulation of storage, transportation and other provisions, all in the same law. At the same time impact assessments have clear provisions for the involvement of local self governments, right from the stage of the screening of the project. It is therefore important to ask whether it is possible to introduce an element of ‘informed consent’ not only in impact assessment and acquisition but also for reconnaissance and prospecting as both these activities show the intent of mineral extraction. Getting consent of those affected by mining operations at every stage should be a structured and continuous process and rather than a one off event as is envisaged in current policies and laws of acquisition and clearance. It is another matter altogether that the question of social control and consent is ignored in all mining regulations that exist at present.
It is difficult to say whether such provisions will contribute towards lessening the conflicts arising out of corporate mining leases. But they will certainly start a process of democratic decision making in the mining sector itself. Hence the provisions of PESA (Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act) may be used and suitably amended to set up monitoring structures at the panchayat levels. At the same time the convergence between local forest administration and panchayats also needs to be strengthened in order to ensure that illegal operations are checked. This is particularly important because there are very few instances where outright violations were a result of large encroachments. Rather most violations were done by companies who already have mining rights but are exceeding their permissible limit. Hence there are cases of over-extraction, stockpiling and illegal transportation, the most prominent of which came to light after the Supreme Court banned all mining of iron ore in Bellary district. The question is that if such violations are rampant because of the ruling class-mining mafia nexus, then the only way of checking such acts is by ensuring compliance through increased social control of elected institutions.
Courtesy : Peoples' Democracy
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