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Sunday, October 3, 2010

NEW PRIVATE BANKS: FOR WHOSE BENEFIT? - Veeraiah Konduri

THE Reserve Bank of India recently released a discussion paper on “Entry of New Private Banks” and sought opinions by the end of September 2010. The paper had a long prologue to justify its call for discussion, quoting from the budgetary commitment of the government as well as its cry for financial inclusion. The paper said, “though Indian financial sector made an impressive stride in resource mobilisation, geographical reach, financial viability, profitability and competitiveness, vast segments of population, especially under-privileged sections of society, have still no access to formal banking services.” Then, in an attempt to theorise the impact of this non-coverage in policy terms, the paper opined, “A wider distribution of and access to financial services helps both consumers and producers to raise their welfare and productivity.” It also gave a long annexure of the experiences from various countries. The RBI wants to focus on the debate by suggesting that “a large number of banks would promote financial inclusion, and ultimately support the inclusive economic growth.”

NO HONEST DISCUSSION

There are certain issues worth pondering regarding this discussion paper. The first is the contradictory nature of the motive. The central bank has itself felt and acknowledged that the Indian financial sector, particularly the banking sector, has since its nationalisation made impressive strides in resource mobilisation, geographical reach, profitability and competitiveness. Then the question is: where is the need for opening up the sector for private banks? The title of the discussion paper gives only partial truth. If we take the RBI's comment that “vast segments of population, especially under-privileged sections of society, have still no access to formal banking services” as an honest acknowledgement of its failure to ensure such access, then the discussion paper should have focussed on the factors desisting the vast sections of people from accessing the financial services. The important factor that impacts the people’s choice in this regard is their capacity to do so. This includes the availability of disposable income and the saving after meeting the domestic needs. It is such savings that are put to productive uses through the banking services. This is the demand side picture of accessibility of the financial services.

The supply side of provision of the banking services is that a person who desires to avail these services or whose needs the government wishes to cater, must not suffer a loss of any of his natural sources of income. This brings into question the proximity of the branch, transaction cost, incentives to depositors, etc. Surprisingly, however, the discussion paper spared itself from raising these issues. The paper confines itself to a discussion of minimising the transaction cost through the use of sophisticated technological devices.

With the type of agenda set out for discussion, however, the RBI has already taken a policy decision of allowing more private banks. It is evident, then, that releasing the discussion paper was part of a motivated attempt to make the concerned community an unwilling partner in its privatisation design. To view the issue holistically, an obvious question would be whether India needs more bank branches to increase the outreach or more new banks. Thus we can say that the discussion paper is not an honest attempt to address the supply side or demand side concerns of financial inclusion.

The discussion paper also avoids the long settled question as to whether industrial houses must be allowed to run the banking services. Allowing them to do so is nothing but questioning the justification behind the banks nationalisation when they were taken over from industrial houses. Another major goal of nationalisation was to make the funds with the banks available for comprehensive development of the nation. Though the RBI has desisted from saying so openly, the eligibility criteria laid out for entry of new players into banking services surely suggest that the RBI is for helping the big industrial houses usurp more space in banking sector. Even now, some industrial houses have, directly or indirectly, controlling stakes in some private banks in the country. It is evident that financial sector reforms are being pushed in the name of financial inclusion, refusing to learn any lessons from the recent global crisis of finance capitalism whose impact the world economy is yet to come out of. In the deep pits of Lehman Brothers and other giants, we do have a lesson or two about the consequences of unfettered financialisation of economy.

SHIFT IN ORIENTATION

Regarding the status of Indian banking industry today, the discussion paper merely gives the number of functional banks and branches. This does not give us any clear picture and we need to look at some more numbers. The data below cover two different phases of financialisation of Indian economy. In one phase the government's intention was to increase the access to financial services with a pro-people orientation and in the other, the same principle is being implemented with a pro-market orientation.

After the banks nationalisation, the resource mobilisation strategy of banking industry focussed more on the rural than urban on areas. This reflected in the fact that rural deposits went up from 6.5 per cent in 1972 to 15 per cent in 1989 whereas the share of deposits from metropolitan centres went down from 46.2 to 38.6 per cent in the same period. Rural credit also witnessed an upward swing from 4.6 to 16.3 per cent between the same years while the credit available in metropolitan areas went down from 60.2 to 43.5 per cent.

This increase in rural credit was predominantly due to the governmental support to agriculture at that time. Contrary to this feature, after the government embarked on ‘reforms’ in 1991, pro-rural banking has taken the back seat. This reflects in the declining reach of rural services, a decline in rural deposit mobilisation and a reduction in rural bank branches. By March 2009, the share of rural deposits in total bank deposit stood at a mere 9.3 per cent. This indicates a reduction in bank branches where the rural poor may deposit their savings, and also the magnitude of distress that Bharat is undergoing in the ‘reforms’ dispensation. It is a fact that agrarian distress has exacerbated in the ‘reformed’ India. At the same time, urban banking has witnessed an upward swing and increase in the share of urban deposits in total bank deposit to 56.2 per cent. It is also important to remind that after nationalisation, banks were so governed as to meet the national requirements and it was made explicit that a bank wishing expansion has to open four branches in rural areas for every new branch in urban areas.

Despite the widespread assertion that rural India has come out of agrarian distress under the UPA regime, the share of rural deposits went down from 12.9 per cent in 2004 to 9.3 by 2009. This is the status even though the government, under certain schemes, deposits the amounts to the beneficiaries’ accounts directly. The RBI discussion paper did not even attempt to discuss this harsh reality.

Financial journalist Manas Chakarvarty has brought out one more aspect on the reach of banking services. Out of the total credit that banking industry is doling out, north eastern states got 1.27 per cent in 1972 and it went up to 1.97 by 1989 basically due to the stress on expanding the geographical outreach of banking services. But after the government embarked on ‘reforms’ and began giving the banks profit targets to prove their competence, the share of credit to the North East went down to 0.86 per cent. Same was the case with Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. Madhya Pradesh's share in total banking credit increased from 2.07 in 1972 to 4.28 per cent in 1989 but slipped down to 2.9 per cent by 2009. UP got 5.6 per cent of total bank credit in 1972, it went up to 7.26 per cent by 1989, but is down to 4.75 per cent now.

NO BLUEPRINT FOR COVERAGE

The discussion paper argues that allowing more banks under private management and allowing industrial houses and non-banking financial institutions to enter into regular banking activities, will help to enhance financial inclusion. But the facts dispel this optimism. Since 1991, no rural bank branch has been opened by a private sector bank. This is so even after allowing 12 new private banks and also some foreign banks to undertake operations. Neither the American Bank nor the HSBC or the Axis Bank operates in rural areas. Nor did they ever come up with a blueprint of extending the financial services, as desired by RBI, to the areas which are bereft of these services. Also, the private banks which we see in urban centres are the result of mergers and amalgamations which do not expand their geographical reach. If the government is asking the nationalised banks to be competitive, why does it not ask a private or a foreign bank to expand its reach? If there is no comprehensive blueprint and a time bound coverage plan, we can't even think that the forthcoming new entities will reach out to the deprived regions and classes.

The RBI has not inserted even a few clauses in the discussion paper to reflect its commitment to financial inclusion. To improve the reach of banking services and enhance inclusion, the key is to make the banking services affordable. This requires reduction in operational costs in the first place. Turning this fact upside down, however, the paper argues in favour of allowing new private and foreign banks. The idea is that they will come with more effective devices to minimise the operational costs. This means that instead of broadening the customer base to absorb the operational costs, RBI is suggesting the use of technological devices, a la the banks in the West. It would have been more appropriate for the RBI if it provided in its paper a comparative statement of operational costs across the major banks, including the existing private banks. This could encourage a reasoned discussion on the role of private banks in reducing the operational costs. But it has not done so. These so-called tech tools are used to reach out to crorepati customers rather than ordinary ones. Further, even if banks in the West have more effective technologies, such tools did not help them withstand the global financial crisis as the banks in India did. In this light, the idea of opening up the banking sector to private and foreign players would look only ill-motivated.

PLEA OF CONSOLIDATION

Another plea is that allowing private players in this sector would improve competitiveness and ultimately benefit the customers. Competitiveness and consolidation are intertwined aspects of financial reform. The country’s biggest bank is SBI. With its 352 billion dollars asset base and 285 billion dollars in deposits, it is ranked 70th in the global list. Keeping this in view, the Narasimham committee in its second avatar recommended three-tier banks consolidation --- 2-3 banks with international characteristics on the top, 8-10 banks in the middle to cater to the national needs, and then some catering to the local level needs. The government has accepted these recommendations in full, feeling that the Indian financial sector is not much globalised. In this era of globalisation, Indian corporates are emerging as MNCs, opting for large scale acquisitions in the international arena, which requires large scale availability of liquidity with the country’s financial sector. But as Indian banks have not that much strength, our corporate houses are forced to look to foreign sources for resource mobilisation to meet their expansionary requirements. External commercial borrowing is one of such tools which the global capital uses to meet their domestic friends’ needs. This is the background in which the government is favouring consolidation of banking sector in India.

This is evident from the statements of successive finance ministers. Latest in this sequence is Pranab Mukherjee’s statement in post-budget briefings when he said, “consolidation may be necessary to improve the state of competitiveness of Indian banking globally.” The finance minister also assured that any consolidation moves by banks would be viewed positively and as major shareholder the government would play a supportive role in the process. The proposed consolidation may help the banks like SBI to move up in its ranking, and foreign entry will help them mobilise deposits across the world. But this kind of consolidation leads to the emergence of investment-banking model which is prevalent in the West. This may also fuel record profits for the entities. But it does not in any way help the poor and middle class customers who deposit their savings with such entities. The consolidation process, while catering to the needs of emerging Indian MNCs, would obviously siphon off the domestic savings which are meant for investment in priority sectors like agriculture or small and medium enterprises, and deploy them elsewhere in the world.

The RBI has also contended that unless it allows more banks in private sector, it cannot open the field for competitiveness. But the entry of more private banks will have adverse impacts for two reasons. The nationalised banks are mandated to lend 40 per cent of their total lending to priority sectors whereas private banks can do this up to 32 per cent. The RBI views the nationalised banks as instruments of social policy, but private banks are exempted from meeting the social policy requirements. Secondly, the RBI is giving the private banks an opportunity to poach the sound customer base of public sector banks. Once the banking sector is globalised, it loses its local feel; it will be delinked from local markets and their developmental aspirations as they are areas of lower margins. This is another way of siphoning off national savings, leaving the priority sectors and rural areas high and dry. This will as well force the country to depend on more foreign sources to finance its development. Opening the financial sector to foreign and domestic private players will thus harm the national developmental goals, which would not only impact the growth opportunities adversely but also exacerbate the inequalities.

Source: www.pd.cpim.org

RANIGANJ COALFIELDS

Raniganj Coalfield, is the birth place of coal mining in the country. In 1774, first mining operation in the country was started in this Coalfield by Sumner & Healy. In 1820, first Coal Company- M/s. Alexander & Company was established. In 1835, first Indian Enterprise i.e. M/s. Carr & Tagore Company was formed. In 1843, the first joint stock Coal Company i.e. M/s. Bengal Coal Company was formed. Since then, underground coal mining operation had been continuing in Raniganj Coalfield by numerous small owners.

In 1973, all Non-Coking Coal Mines were nationalized and brought under Eastern Division of Coal Mines Authority Limited. In 1975, Eastern Coalfields Limited, a Subsidiary of Coal India Limited (C.I.L.), was formed and inherited all the private sector coal mines of Raniganj Coalfield.Area of Raniganj Coalfield is 1530 Sq.Kms spreading over Burdwan, Birbhum, Bankura and Purulia Districts in West Bengal and Dhanbad District in Jharkhand. Heart of Raniganj Coalfield is, however, in Burdwan District bounded by Ajoy River in North and Damodar River in South. Kasta Coalfied is located on the North of Adjoy while Mejia and Parbelia are on South of Damodar River.

At present E.C.L. has 107 operating mines out of which 89 are underground mines and remaining 18 are opencast mines.
Total Coal Reserve upto 600 m depth is 23 billion tonnes in West Bengal. Out of this, proven extractable reserve is 6 billion tonnes in West Bengal.

Raniganj Coalfield of E.C.L. has special characteristic containing the best type of non-coking coal reserves in the country. All the heat intensive industries like Glass, Ceramic, Refractories, Forging etc. are exclusively dependent on Raniganj Coal. Other industries also prefer Raniganj Coal. The entire Export of Coal from the country is being done from Raniganj Coalfield.
Raniganj coalfield also contains large reserves of iron ore occurring chiefly as nodules. Good quality fire clay occurs in the Barakar stage of the Raniganj coalfield. Besides, the fire clays, various other types of useful clays occur at several places in the Raniganj coalfield belt, of which, the pottery clays of the Ronei and the light coloured brick clays of Durgapur deserved special mention.

Other Mines

Raniganj coalfield also contains large reserves of iron ore. Good quality fire clay occurs in the Barakar stage of the Raniganj coalfield. The fire clays, various other types of useful clays occur at several places in the Raniganj coalfield belt, of which, the pottery clays of the Ronei and the light coloured brick clays of Durgapur deserved special mentionBeside this the important minerals found in the district are , calcium carbonate, Manganese, Bauxite and laterite etc.

Source : Barddhaman District Gazetteers

5th. MAY COAL STRIKE - NEW LANDMARK IN THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

JIBON ROY, General Secretary
All India Coal Workers Federation

The 5th, May Coal workers’ Strike have attained a new land mark both in participation and consciousness? This has been the first working class action ever carried in an industrial scale against disinvestment. In true sense this has been a class action on policy question. This strike has been a great leap forward from pure trade unionism towards policy orientation. This is the first time issue is not allowed to be crowded with miscellaneous demands. Workers who have struck work, whichever may be the percentage it was, they did it with a unity of purpose and wisdom. According to conservative estimate made at the Federation HQ the rate of strike would be between 55 to 60% and around 3 lack miners including contractor workers joined the industrial action.

Those who have the earlier experiences for leading such struggle know about how such struggle on policy leads workers to new height of enlightenment. It is also common experience that while leading such struggle leadership is always subjected to combined opposition from reformists from within and outside, management and the government. They also know that a strike against ‘disinvestment’, if it is fought truly to its platform, turns into a platform serving multiple purposes. If such struggle unite workers through rousing them into a new height of consciousness about their patriotic role to themselves and the country, it awaken people into a unity with the workers on the question of public right over public assets. Thus this struggle carries the workers to a new kind of unity. This unity carry working class breaking the stagnancy and for climbing a new plateau of enlightenment. In course of all such struggle, it is seen that the leaders who grown on spontaneity or through easy going life get generally lined with the employers, overtly or covertly. In such eventuality a trade union leadership loyal and committed to class politics, has to learn submitting itself answering all evil arguments and logics of machinations which are likely to be advanced by the combination of reformist leaders in league with the management and government.

The 5th, May strike accounts for such a struggle which lambasted an alliance of convenience and the game exploiting the workers’ pride of their being in the coal industry and in the process facilitating the way of privatization. An argument has been advanced that if the Coal India is not allowed to be enlisted in the share market, the Company would loose its Navaratna status. Thus an attempt was made to carry workers with a sense of fake patriotism. Workers argued that all the assets and the profit, pomp and prestige whichever the Coal India could mint, with no exception of being a Navaratna, are all the consequence of labour and hence nothing be regarded above the workers. The popular response to 5th. May strike have vindicated the position taken by coal workers? The message which has been focused in the strike is that if workers could bring some pride to Coal India, those could be retained alone through holding public status to the company.

It is blamed that this strike has hampered the spirit of unity which has been shaping in recent period at the Central level amongst the major national trade union centers. AICWF felt otherwise. If it is agreed that no alliance or unity on personal reason/reasons or the reason/reasons for blindly following the dictum of ruling government/governments can be reasoned as the unity then it has to be agreed that whichever we presume as unity, is not unity in real sense. And again if it is further believed that all unity should lead towards an unity of wisdom and for a purpose, then it has to be agreed that whichever sense of disunity is reflected within the mutual relations amongst the leaderships of different federations in coal industry, would in the end contribute in raising the unity to a new height and for a purpose. If the process for working together is disturbed any way in Coal Industry, it is mostly because of the reason for some leaders in the Federation separating themselves from the general policy of their own central organization and the consensus arrived earlier amongst the federations.

No leader amongst the functioning Federations can dispute the fact that there was a total unanimity amongst the trade unions on the matter of opposing privatization in coal industry in whatsoever form it may come. It was decided that advent of any such move would be responded by immediate action. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the fact that opposition to disinvestment form an important agenda in the unity platform built at central level. In fact this earlier decision in the Federation level had formed the basis for consensus amongst five functioning Federations in Ranchi meeting of 27th. March. Accordingly an agreement was reached on a charter of demands with opposition to disinvestment in the focus. Randhi meeting had also adopted a phased programme of struggle which was to culminate into 72 hours strike effecting from 5th. May. Had the Federation leaders were serious about the commitment they made publicly from Ranchi how could they get victim of a fake sense about ‘Navaratna Pride’ and carried away into a reverse journey. If Trade union leaders scrutinize the course of event with a sense of introspection, they may find the recent developments in coal movement as an important piece of schooling. Coal India Officials may boast themselves for their capability to rouse a semblance of employers’ like ‘pride’ amongst the leading ranks in the Federation about ‘Navaratna’ status for Coal India and tried to subvert the demand for the retention of public status of ownership in the mining. There was no amount of logic which could suggest the central leaderships jumping a wrong notions as have been carried by some leaders in the Federations. This was surprising that the All India leadership of AITUC and BMS have taken little pain to investigate the issue with some details. As a consequence they could neither defend the interest of coal workers or their own policy on the question of ‘disinvestment’. They could not even defend the erring leaders down below which had been probably guiding their judgment.

The Coal strike has proved beyond doubt that if workers are adequately educated they never support any shortsighted divisive approach as arisen out of non class and narrow mindedness. If the emotions which was It believed that there were ways for persuasion and reconciliations. But sudden about turn of some federation leaders unwrapping Ranchi declaration and the overzealousness of coal ministry and Coal India combine to exploit the agreement with the leaders of three national federations to denigrate coal workers, had forced the AICWF to pursue Ranchi decision single handedly.

It would not be impertinent if it is said that the minutes signed jointly by the National Federations along with the Coal India management made 5th. May strike inevitable. This was signed on 16th. April in New Delhi at Coal Ministry office, ignoring the views advanced by CITU led All India Coal Workers Federation and HMS led Hind Khadan Mazdoor Sangh. It is now proved that the leadership of those three who signed the minutes had fallen victim to management’s ill advice and committed gross harm to coal workers. In the said memorandum of understanding, the leaders had agreed to surrender their right to oppose disinvestment and this ‘virtue’ has been committed in lieu of some insignificant miscellaneous. The Federations who were bound are INTUC led Indian National Mines Workers Federation, AITUC led Indian Mines Workers Federation and BMS led Akhil Bharatiya Khadan Mazdoor Sangh. Workers raised a simple question after this fateful agreement. Had the united trade Union movement failed to stop the way of disinvestment even after their sincere effort to mobilize mass of workers, issue could have been allowed to roll in its own course, instead of signing the ‘charter of surrender’. Workers took it a point of great disgrace that. Coal turned to be the first case in India when the leaders of three trade unions themselves came forward to sign hanging of ‘public right’ over public assets. Coal Ministry used this signed minutes as the memorandum of understanding and given instant and wide publicity.

When AICWF representative has been snubbed for his request to defer the implementation of disinvestment till a consensus is worked out between the management and negotiating unions, it was clear that the conclusion of the meeting was drawn before the date of the meeting was fixed. This had forced the painful and unkind division amongst the Federations. Only those who were present would be able to count the fact that the meeting of 16th. April which was convened at the behest of the Coal Ministry has been a pre-arranged meeting with a pre-determined conclusion. The desk has been cleared 14 o’clock noon. As said earlier, decision had broken a split in the ranks of trade unions in line of 3:2. The AICWF General Secretary who represented the Federation quitted the meeting after Chairman vacated the chair with the promise to return back for witnessing the signing ‘ceremony’ incidentally Hon’ble Minister of Coal himself chaired the session. Finally, HMS went with CITU and refused to sign the understanding which came in the form of a signed minute. This was the circumstances which had prepared the ground for 5th. May Strike. . The strike had to be commanded, if not for defending mines & workers from disinvestment but to save them from the disgrace heaped that as if the coal workers have accepted ‘disinvestment’.

The huge participation in the strike had made the campaign carried by AITUC led Federation accusing the strike call as the making of CITU, fallen flat. Similarly, the disinformation campaign carried by few leaders of BMS affiliated Federation which took an worst form when fraudulent SMS propaganda were carried to CITU ranks had been made frustrated by workers. All through 4th and 5th.May gossips were made to spread that strike that as if strike is withdrawn. Disinformation campaign did not stop there itself. The Coal India management tried all the worst to seal public communications between AICWF leadership and mass of the workers. This strike has educated the first hand experience how a powerful employer can manipulate electronic and print media which has mushroomed in all the coal dominated cities and colonies.

AICWF is posted with the incidences of distributing fabulous gift to media persons just couple of days before the strike. However, media have given little bit indulgence to reality also. Notwithstanding, there were no takers of all these lies and propagandas because of the reason that those leaders by this time had lost much of their credibility. Which had harmed them most was the refusal to come clear either to support the 5th. May strike or to declare an alternative date for a united working class action. Neither of these was possible for them as they were not capable to disown the legacy of memorandum of settlement they signed. The strenuous face saving exercises from the part of AITUC leaders had failed to rescue the leaders responsible for committing AITUC in a writing agreement to initiate the process of disinvestment in Coal. The leader/leaders did not know that the entire regiment of coal workers were witnessing the
Maneuvering enactment which was being staged in Delhi. This continued for more than an ten days and kept the matter of finalizing a common date for strike kept hanging till the evening of 3rd. May. The way the ‘awaiting’ was brought to end brought no grace for the central leadership in AITUC. They got themselves ended with an ‘appeal’ to CITU which came practically in tone of ‘managerial command’ asking the CITU leadership in the centre to force the AICWF for deferring the strike unconditionally

Which the leadership reasonably refused. In the meantime in their exercise to ‘unify’ the ‘check off fraternity’ a ‘saving’ operation, AITUC leadership could rope the HMS leader. Thus the ‘check-off fraternity’ thought, as if they at last have found a good ground to corner AICWF. But unfortunately, central leaders failed to realize that the extent of credibility have been lost to their leaders in Federations would not have been restored by taking negative approach. They did not recognize the other aspect of the crisis, which had widened the gap of trustworthiness with the Federation leaders. This mischief has been committed by the Coal India management through spreading disinformation and manipulations.

The success rate of the strike had been questioned even when the strike was yet to be materialized. The fifth strike has proved that when an act gets the class emotion is injured, a working class action do not go by any arithmetic calculation and in line of dominating influence. The strike has proved further that any class action if carried on class line and workers could be carried with its efficacy; a call of such action would always find wide response, even though workers are weak organizationally. The HQ of AICWF is informed that in many of the backward areas like Rajmahal under CCL (Jharkhand), Basundhara and Talcher under Mahanadi coal fields (Orissa) workers themselves at their own initiative had organized strike. If the rate of strike in ECL is taken at 85%, BCCL as 70%, CCL at around 45%, North Eastern Coalfield at 70%, strike rate in Coal India comes to around 60%, even if percentage is given to WCL at 40% and SECL at round 35% and 20% in NCL. In Mahanadi Coal Mines which is mined mostly by contractor workers, there were substantial strikes. In Coal India HQ and other offices in Kolkata and Dhanbad the strike rate was 90% and similar is the rate in the units under CMPDI. However, in Darbhanga house it was only 20% In respect of production, transportation and washing of coal the entire system has been disrupted. Gevra project of SECL which represents 24% of total production in Coal India the strike rate has been 60%; most of the washeries were closed. Contractor workers’ participation was large in all the coal companies. The fraternity aspects of the strike also were important. It is reported that about 15% of the total working strength in Singarani had struck work in support of Coal India workers. On the whole as it is assessed in AICWF HQ that if the emotion generated in course of preparation of the strike, strike rate should have been overwhelming. But it could not attained that height only because of the fact that organizers could not reach all the ten thousands odd pitheads after it became eminent in the evening of 3rd. May that AICWF alone has to go strike.

In the end, AICWF has no hesitation to note that the whichever, wrongs or misdoing are committed in the entire episode were basically the making of Federation leaderships. AICWF is indebted to the National leaderships of various centers for their effort to resolve the difficulties of the Federation. If they were not successful, blame should go to down level leaderships. Had the Central leadership been Adequately advised about the real depth of the crisis, probably they could have taken a realistic view.
The magnitude of the trauma which had gripped the mining families when incessant flashing of a ‘news’ item in TV screen had been rocking the dream which they kept living beneath their chest. It was the dream mixed with hope that – we don’t allow the return of the nightmare of the past. The leaders never tried to assess that the fall out of the wrong doings would not have been erased out by forcing a national trade union centre who could withstand a combined pressure to succumb.

This was not the experience of individuals but all the members who negotiated the memorandum of settlement with the Coal India that by the time they could reach their residence, they found TV screen had been roaring with the news of an awe-inspiring ‘victory’ – ‘the victory towards multi nationalization of coal industry.’ Thus, ‘16th. Evening’ had turned to be the blackest day for the Indian trade union movement during modern period, when disinvestment has been ‘negotiated’ and agreed in black and white. At the same time, that has been the ‘First Evening’ for the coal workers to realize their ‘political strength’ to influence the co-relation of strength.

AICWF still holds great regards for their Federation level leadership in HMS and their ranks. It is despite HMS led Federation’s going back from the strike in the last point. It was not an easy for withstanding the pressure from three major Federations and supporting the workers. They at their own initiative had served strike notices in all the companies along with AICWF. HMS led Federation maintained a high profile campaign in favour of the strike till the direction to separate itself came down from the HMS leadership. They addressed meetings almost everywhere. The author of this article had the opportunity to address number of such meetings over the pits. Those meetings were organized jointly by both the Federations. HMS campaign had been punctured by long distanced telephonic calls communicated individually from the highest leadership of HMS. The excuse given for withdrawal was amusing. If an imaginative ‘neglect’ towards the ‘leader’ could be shown as the justification for joining the ‘platform’ which had been marked earlier as harmful to the interest of miners and mining found friendly overnight.

However, whichever has happened is happened. AICWF will feel happy to carry lesson from the entire episode, instead of carrying forward bitterness of past mistrust. Despite all troubles and difficulties, it considers that it as the biggest relief for the coal workers that the happenings of last three months have brought them back to the same square where they were on 27rh. March. AICWF wishes to carry unity forward from this point. AICWF believes that in its relations with other National Federations, the content of unity still continued to be the dominating feature. AICWF announces its firm commitment for holding the flag of unity flying high and high. In this context AICWF considers the support from the national leadership as of supreme importance for bringing back all the Federations in the coal industry into the platform built on 27th. March in Ranchi. AICWF strongly believes that if the consolidation is delayed, the Management and the Ministry would try for going vindictive to shatter the unity platform for all time. The task of the ranks in various National Federations who have vindicated their desire for unity is identified in this point. The AICWF calls upon its ranks to prepare themselves for any kind of sacrifice in their carrying forward the campaign against the move to convert ‘public right’ into the grip of ‘private’ and to unite the ranks of all Federations.
Source: citu